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COPPER WELD CORP. V. INDEPENDENCE TUBE CORP.:
HAS THE SUPREME COURT PULLED THE
PLUG ON THE "BATHTUB
CONSPIRACY"?
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 of the Sherman Act' declares illegal every "contract, com-
bination ... or conspiracy" in restraint of trade.2 Typically, a section 1
plaintiff alleges a conspiracy between two or more distinct business enti-
ties, and the court focuses on whether the defendants made an agreement
to restrain trade.3 The question of conspiratorial capacity becomes more
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal."
2. Id.
3. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946), the Supreme
Court established the classic definition of conspiracy as "a unity of purpose or a common
design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement." See also
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1055 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662
F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
Although a § 1 conspiracy is most easily established by evidence of an explicit agreement to
restrain trade, see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 213-18 (1899), a
tacit understanding is sufficient. United States v. General Motors Co., 394 U.S. 127, 142-43
(1966); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043
(1980); Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
In order to violate § 1, a conspiratorial agreement must also unreasonably restrain trade.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Courts have
developed two methods for determining whether such a restraint has occurred: First is the per
se rule, which holds illegal those "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality."
Id. Second is the rule of reason, which governs those "agreements whose competitive effect
can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the re-
straint, and the reason why it is imposed." Id. Typical per se violations include horizontal
price fixing, bid rigging and market division, vertical price fixing, certain group boycotts and
some tying arrangements. See generally ABA Ar~nTRUsT SECTION, ANTITRusT LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS 22-49, 56-65, 75-91 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS]; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 165-97 (1977); P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CAsEs ch. 3A (3d ed. 1981).
Where per se violations are not apparent, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the
subject conduct amounts to an unreasonable restraint of trade. In Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1971) and National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the Court limited the rule of reason inquiry to a question of
whether the subject restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses compe-
tition" in terms of the "impact on competitive conditions." Professional Eng'rs, 425 U.S. at
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traenterprise" or "bathtub" conspiracy.
The Supreme Court decided Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp. 7 amidst long-standing confusion and controversy surrounding the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. Prior to Copperweld, problems re-
lated to the doctrine were clearly evident: circuit courts had settled on
several conflicting tests for invoking the intraenterprise principle;8 com-
mentators had condemned the concept for decades;9 and the Supreme
Court had provided little guidance in the area with a scattered line of ill-
defined precedents. I° The Copperweld Court attempted to put the in-
traenterprise conspiracy debate to rest. 1
In Copperweld, the Court held that as a matter of law a parent cor-
poration and its wholly-owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Although the Court admit-
ted that it had previously acquiesced in the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine, it reasoned that it had never before fully analyzed its justifica-
7. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
8. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
9. See, eg., Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L. REv. 451, 453
(1983) (arguing that the intraenterprise doctrine is a misplaced attempt to reach significant
anticompetitive behavior "that otherwise would fall into the interstices of Sherman, Clayton,
and the Federal Trade Commission Acts," and should be rejected or severely limited); Handler
& Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV.
23, 25 (1981) (concluding that the policies of the antitrust laws would best be served by hold-
ing as a matter of law that where a subsidiary or alfiliate is wholly-owned or controlled by its
parent corporation, the corporations are incapable of conspiring); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust
Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1968) (same, with the
exception that the authors would retain the principle for limited situations in which incorpo-
rated subsidiaries hold themselves out as competitors or in which the subsidiaries are specifi-
cally created or used to achieve anticompetitive results); Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has
Seagram Distrilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. L. 173, 181 (discussing the strength of the
doctrine in 1968 but noting that it appears to be most applicable "where the conduct involved
is beyond defense and involves coercion of outsiders"); McQuade, Conspiracy and Mul-
ticorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 186, 215 (1955)
(noting that if the doctrine is extended to its logical conclusion "[a]ny nationally coordinated
multicorporate enterprise could hardly escape a violation," and suggesting that "[t]here must
be some opportunity to show economic justification") (footnote omitted); see also Rahl, Con-
spiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspir-
acy, 9 ABA ANTIRUjsT SECrION REP. 20 (1956); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 717 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, A Suggested Standard]; Note, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Deci-
sionmaking Approach], 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1732 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, A
Decisionmaking Approach]; Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intraenterprise Con-
spiracy, 23 MONT. L. REv. 158 (1962).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 29-70 for a discussion of the historical development
of the intraenterprise doctrine in the Supreme Court.
11. The Copperweld Court expressly stated that it "granted certiorari to reexamine the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine." 104 S. Ct. at 2736 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 2745.
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tion. 13 The Court rejected the intraenterprise doctrine because it errone-
ously allowed section 1 to apply to single enterprise conduct whereas
Congress intended section 1 to scrutinize agreements "between separate
entities."' 4 A parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, the
Court reasoned, cannot be considered separate economic actors for anti-
trust purposes.' 5
The Court's decision in Copperweld does not settle the intraenter-
prise debate. By expressly limiting its holding to the facts before it, 6 the
Court chose not to address a range of intraenterprise relationships which
may still be subject to section 1 scrutiny. The holding in Copperweld is
not controlling with respect to agreements between parent corporations
and their partially-owned subsidiaries, or with respect to agreements
among wholly-owned or partially-owned affiliates which share a common
parent. This Note discusses the application of Copperweld to these in-
traenterprise relationships.
The Court's adoption of an economic enterprise approach to anti-
trust law also raises an interesting question about intraenterprise liability
in general. Several commentators argue strongly in favor of an economic
enterprise justification for "piercing the corporate veil"17 to find a parent
corporation responsible for the liabilities of its subsidiary.' 8 This Note
questions whether the law should permit corporations and their subsidi-
aries to avoid section 1 scrutiny because they are one economic enter-
prise, while continuing to treat the same corporations as separate entities
to shield the parent from the liability of a subsidiary.
13. Id. at 2736.
14. Id. at 2740 (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 2745.
16. The Court expressly limited its holding to wholly-owned subsidiaries. Id. at 2740. See
infra note 152.
17. For a definition and discussion of piercing the corporate veil to hold a parent liable for
its subsidiary's acts, see infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
18. See, eg., P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS §§ 102-02.1 (1983), dis-
cussed at infra text accompanying notes 193-97. Other commentators have noted the similari-
ties between the intraenterprise issue and the issue of piercing the corporate veil. See Handler
& Smart, supra note 9, at 65 (stating that "intracorporate conspiracy doctrine has flourished in
an environment which is most conducive to piercing the corporate veil"); see also Areeda,
supra note 9, at 469 n.64 (noting that piercing the corporate veil determines circumstances
under which previously established liability of subsidiary should be imputed to parent, while
intraenterprise doctrine is concerned with establishing illegality in the first place; also noting




A. The Sherman Act
When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, the United States had
become a world industrial force. Capital intensive production began to
dominate the manufacturing industries, and as these production opera-
tions grew so did their markets. 19 Following the lead of European car-
tels,2 0 United States industry witnessed a wave of mergers and corporate
consolidations unequaled in its history. l
Congress passed the Sherman Act 2 to balance the profit-seeking be-
havior of private enterprises with the public interest in maintaining com-
petitive markets.2 3 It was hoped that the statute would function both to
inhibit undesirable business conduct and to channel and shape market
structure along competitive lines."4 In this respect, section 1 was aimed
at competitors who deliberately attempted to stifle competitive market
forces through mutual agreement,z" while section 2 was aimed at an-
ticompetitive effects considered to be inherent in a single firm possessing
monopoly power.2 6  Although section 1 enforcement began inauspi-
19. See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 58-59 (1954); A.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES 422-25
(1970).
20. H. THORELLI, supra note 19, at 58-91; A. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 424. Professor
Sullivan defines a cartel as an "arrangement through which two or more firms negotiate con-
certed decisions about price, output, or territory, yet continue to independently control all
other aspects of their operations." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 154. Apart from the obvious
anticompetitive effects of cartelization with respect to price fixing, such arrangements also lead
to inefficient internal organization and a disincentive to compete through innovation. For ex-
ample, in England, the British economy in the 1950's and 1960's was greatly weakened, in
part, by sluggishness resulting from several decades of cartelization. A. SCHERER, supra note
19, at 405 (citing R. CAVES, BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 12-13, 279-323, 491-93 (1968)).
21. H. THORELLI, supra note 19, at 72-91.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
23. A. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 424-25.
24. Id. at 424; see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 19-29; P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 5-
43.
25. Professor Sullivan writes:
The statutory phrase, "contract, combination or conspiracy," conjures up the classic
image of robber barons gathering clandestinely to carve up a market. The statute,
classically conceived, aims at bad conduct, at conspirators who deliberately plan...
and execute action to stifle market forces. . . . [T]he classical concept of concerted
action is a horizontal one; it deals with the way competitors relate to each other ...
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 311-12 (emphasis added).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) makes it a crime to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire. . . to monopolize any part [of interstate or foreign commerce]." Gener-
ally, a firm has monopolized if it has obtained or maintained the power to control prices or
exclude competition in the relevant market. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v.
Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 106-32. An
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ciously,2 7 it eventually became a major weapon for policing anticompeti-
tive behavior between separate firms.28
attempt to monopolize may be established even where the power of the firm in the relevant
market falls short of monopoly. A prima facie case of attempt is established by showing (1)
specific intent to monopolize unilaterally or with others, with (2) a "dangerous possibility of
success." See, e.g., Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953);
but cf United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 612 n.1 (1977) (a mere
business desire to increase market share does not satisfy this standard).
Monopoly by combination and conspiracy under § 2 is the provision most relevant to this
Note. It is important because the intraenterprise debate does not exist when the issue is combi-
nation or conspiracy to monopolize. Despite the statute's use of the word conspiracy, § 2 does
not require a plurality of actors because it addresses unilateral firm conduct. Copperweld, 104
S. Ct. at 2740. The essential element of a § 2 conspiracy is a specific act or course of conduct
with the intent to monopolize. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), infra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text; see also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 789 (1946) ("Petitioners. . . might have been convicted here of conspiracy to monopolize
without ever having acquired the power to carry out the object of the conspiracy. . ").
Moreover, the "dangerous probability of success" requirement is not applicable to § 2 conspir-
acies. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1980) ("no
particular level of market power or 'dangerous probability of success' has to be alleged or
proved in a [§ 2] conspiracy claim"), cert denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
Monopoly power means the ability to affect or control the price and output of a given
product in a certain product market. See, eg., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 50, 58 (1911) (Standard Oil's ability to control prices was monopoly power despite
appellants' relatively small share of the crude oil market); see also American Tobacco Co., 328
U.S. at 182-83 (purpose of Act was to protect against market conduct "designed to injure
others" by "driving competitors out of business," and erecting "barriers to entry"). However,
beginning with United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the
intuitive approach of the earlier cases was replaced by a more modem structural analysis.
Writing for the court, Judge Learned Hand introduced a two-step analysis: the court first is to
define the relevant market, and then assess the defendant's power in that market. This ap-
proach, with some fine tuning, has since been generally followed. See, e.g., United States v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384
U.S. 563 (1966); see also ANTTRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 3, at 110-21 (discuss-
ing the recent cases in the area). For an excellent treatment of the economic theory related to
the ill-effects of monopoly power, see A. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 13-36.
27. Professor Scherer provides a good summary of the Sherman Act's beginnings:
Enforcement of the Sherman Act during its first 10 years was unspectacular, to
say the least. Several attorneys general entrusted with enforcing the law lacked not
only funds and personnel, but also enthusiasm, partly because of prior affiliations as
private counsel to leading corporations. The government also suffered significant
legal defeats in cases brought against the Whiskey and Sugar Trusts-setbacks trace-
able in no small measure to careless preparation and unimaginative argumentation.
However, government test case victories in 1897 and 1899 set the stage for an invigo-
rated enforcement program after Theodore Roosevelt took office as President in
1901.
A. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 424.
28. See generally H. THORELLI, supra note 19, at ch. 8; see also cases cited supra at note 3
(discussing development of per se and rule of reason approaches to § I enforcement).
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B. "Intraenterprise Conspiracy"
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was a policy response to the
unscrutinized anticompetitive conduct of a single enterprise or firm.29
The need for the doctrine arose, in part, in response to the development
of oligopolistic market structures in the United States.3" In highly con-
centrated markets, firms could jointly influence price and output without
acting as monopolists. Courts simply did not, and still do not, recognize
that these so-called shared monopolies can violate section 2.31 Similarly,
single firms could coordinate their subsidiaries and affiliates with little
fear of violating section 2. Antitrust plaintiffs eventually turned to sec-
tion 1 to combat anticompetitive single firm conduct that did not violate
section 2. The ambiguity of section 1 nurtured the concept that a single
enterprise could conspire with itself to restrain trade.
Judicial acceptance of an intraenterprise conspiracy began with
United States v. General Motors Corp.32 There, the Seventh Circuit up-
held a criminal conviction of General Motors Corporation (GM) and
three of its wholly-owned subsidiaries for violating both sections 1 and 2
by conspiring to force GM dealers to finance their purchases and car
29. As one commentator has explained:
The policy concern of the [intraenterprise] doctrine came to be with arrangements
unduly threatening the desired automatic play of competitive forces in a free market
place. The occasion for realizing that one person or enterprise could, without joining
forces with competitors or without committing some independent crime or tort, seri-
ously threaten the competitive order had not yet arisen .... Few entrepreneurs
could individually dominate or even materially influence the free play of market
forces. The danger lay not in concentration of power ... but in the propensity of
traders to associate or conspire.
Rahl, supra note 9, at 746 (footnote omitted); see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 324
("enforcement officials are inevitably and understandably drawn by conspiracy theory in their
efforts to strike down single firm conduct which is harmful to competition, but fails to cross
the threshold of monopolization or attempt to monopolize").
30. Oligopoly means "few sellers" or shared monopoly. P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 270-
71. An oligopolistic market structure can be said to exist when "the sellers are sufficiently few
in number so that each believes his economic fortunes are perceptively influenced by the mar-
ket actions of other individual firms, and that those firms are in turn affected significantly by
his own actions." A. SCHERER, supra note 19, at 10. It is similar to a monopolistic market
structure in that the individual competitors have a perceptive influence on price; that is, to
some extent they possess market power weighing on monopoly power. Id. Although oligopo-
lies differ from monopolies in that the few firms in the market are still supposed to compete,
statistical studies generally reveal that oligopolistic markets lend themselves to higher prices
and noncompetitive performance. See Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration,
American Manufacturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951).
31. P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 289. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 330-73 for a
full treatment of the oligopoly problem, including the various legal theories, current trends and
legislative proposals for dealing with it.
32. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
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sales through a GM financed subsidiary.33 The defendants claimed a
"single trader defense," 34 contending that they were affiliated, noncom-
peting units engaged in a single enterprise and could not be held liable for
conspiracy under section L"3 Without citing any authority, the court
held that the defendants possessed conspiratorial capacity and could not
"enjoy the benefits of separate corporate identity."'36
The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is not so much the
particular form of business organization effected, as it is the
presence or absence of restraint of trade and commerce. But
even if the single trader doctrine were applicable, it would not
help the appellants.37
33. Id. at 398.
34. Unlike the intraenterprise doctrine, the single trader defense has its origin in the verti-
cal context of manufacturer-dealer relations. The defense, commonly known as the "Colgate
Doctrine," generally made it permissible for manufacturers to refuse to deal with dealers who
did not follow an announced resale price policy. See United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919). However, the Colgate Doctrine was itself limited substantially by the Court's
decisions in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1960) (terminated dealer
could allege conspiracy between manufacturers and independent dealers where steps went be-
yond mere refusal to deal), and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (hiring
outside agents overstepped unilateral conduct when done to enforce maximum resale prices).
The intraenterprise doctrine had afforded dealers a way around Colgate. In those cases in
which manufacturers' subsidiaries were also dealers, the plaintiff dealer could allege a conspir-
acy between the subsidiary dealer and the manufacturer. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) (finding a § 1 conspiracy based on in-
traenterprise theory, with an alternative holding based on an exception to Colgate Doctrine;
see infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text).
At the same time that the Colgate Doctrine had developed exceptions or issues giving rise
to intraenterprise concepts, courts had begun to deal with the issue of intracorporate conspira-
cies involving corporate officers. See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir.)
(officers and agents of cash register company which gained control of 90% of the market
violated both §§ 1 and 2 of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915). The Patterson
court specifically noted that § 1 of the Sherman Act could include conspiracies "between com-
petitors, or between the officers and agents of a competitor on its behalf against a competitor."
Id. at 618. Although the court's language was dictum because it was properly a § 2 case, it
does show that courts considered the intracorporate conspiracy issue well before establishing
the general rule excluding officers, directors, and employees from § 1 liability (this rule is
discussed supra at note 5).
35. 121 F.2d at 404.
36. Id.
37. Id. As one noted writer has suggested, this passage can be read to mean: "Form
matters. Form does not really matter. Even if form did really matter, you're stuck anyhow."
See McQuade, supra note 9, at 191 (emphasis in original). The court's proposition that "the
test of illegality [under § 1] is the presence or absence of restraint of trade in commerce" also
appears to have been a misstatement of the law, as § 1 necessarily requires combination or
conspiracy in addition to restraint of trade. Apparently, the court relied upon International
Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), a case that applied § 3 of the
Clayton Act, which does not require conspiring entities. See Stengal, supra note 9, at 10-12 for
a discussion of this point.
INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
The General Motors court concluded that even though GM and its
subsidiaries may have constituted a single integrated enterprise "as a
matter of economics," they were separate entities "as a matter of law.",38
In the following years, the judiciary increasingly adopted the idea that
section 1 addressed entities that were legal rather than economic in form.
The Supreme Court first addressed the intraenterprise question in
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,39 which involved the relationship be-
tween a taxicab manufacturing corporation and several Yellow Cab affili-
ates which it had acquired and controlled as one family." The complaint
alleged conspiracies under both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
among the controlling shareholder, the manufacturing corporation and
five operating corporations.41 The Court found conspiracies under both
sections and in dictum stated:
[A]ny affiliation or integration flowing from an illegal conspir-
acy cannot insulate the conspirators from the sanctions which
Congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships of the
conspirators . . . are not determinative of the applicability of
the Sherman Act.
[T]he common ownership and control of the various corporate
appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and
conspiracy from the impact of the Act.4 2
This language became the life-breath of the intraenterprise doctrine and,
according to some, had taken on "talismanic qualities" prior to
Copperweld.4
After Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court applied the intraenterprise
concept in four other cases. The first of these was Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States,' in which the Court found that negotiations con-
38. 121 F.2d at 410.
39. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
40. One person, Morris Markin, headed the firm. He owned 100% of the stock of the Cab
Sales and Parts Corporation and a controlling interest in Checker Cab Manufacturing Corp.
(CCM). CCM held 62% of the stock in Parmelees Transportation Co., which in turn owned
30% of Chicago Yellow Cab and 100% of several other operating companies. Chicago Yellow
Cab held complete ownership of Yellow Cab. Id. at 221-22.
41. Id. at 224.
42. Id. at 227.
43. Areeda, supra note 9, at 458.
44. 334 U.S. 110 (1948). Prior to Schine Chain Theatres, the Court had considered one
other movie case which indirectly dealt with the intraenterprise concept. In United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), the United States successfully prosecuted sec-
tion 1 and 2 claims against horizontally integrated claims of theatre exhibitors. The Court
found that the defendants had used their buying power in towns with no competing theatres to
induce distributors to give preferential treatment to their movie houses in towns with compet-
ing theatres. Id. at 180-83. This was sufficient evidence to find an attempt to monopolize local
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ducted by a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiaries with motion pic-
ture distributors had illegally restrained trade."a Although the case
could have been decided on the ground of attempted monopolization,46
the Court chose instead to rely on section 1. It reasoned that "[t]he con-
certed action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and the named of-
ficers and directors. . . was a conspiracy which was not immunized by
reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated rather than
independent."'47
By this time, the intraenterprise concept had evolved into a doctrine.
When the Court decided Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc.,4 there was no hesitation to apply it to competing subsidiaries.
In Kiefer-Stewart, the Court found that two wholly-owned subsidi-
aries of a liquor distiller were guilty under section 1 of jointly refusing to
supply a wholesaler who declined to abide by a maximum resale pricing
scheme. 9 The Court rejected defendant Seagram's argument that its
subdivisions merely acted as instrumentalities of a single manufacturing/
markets in violation of § 2. Justice Douglas noted that the "vice of this undertaking was the
combination of several exhibitors in a plan of concerted action." Id. at 183. Although some
writers have suggested this was recognition of an intraenterprise theory, see, e.g., Rahl, supra
note 9, at 764 n.69, the record showed that one family owned a majority of the stock in Cres-
cent, which in turn owned 50% of the stock in two of the theatre distributors and that Cres-
cent had no ownership interest in the two other defendants. McQuade, supra note 9, at 196-97.
In essence the case is like Timken, see infra note 53 and accompanying text, in which a typical
combination existed. Nevertheless, the Schine Court understood Crescent to support the in-
traentreprise concept. Schine, 334 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1948).
Another movie case decided the same day as Schine was United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100 (1948), in which four theatre corporations and two individuals were charged with
using their buying power to contract certain exclusive privileges with local distributors. Id. at
101-04. The case appeared to rest on a § 2 theory but the Court stated that "[t]he appellees,
having combined with each other and with the distributors to obtain those monopoly rights,
formed a conspiracy in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Act." Id. at 109. However, the two
affiliated corporations shared no common control except for common selling agencies, and the
mutual stock holdings in each other were minimal. Id. This, too, suggests a § I premise in
that the case involved distinct economic entities under the law at that time. McQuade, supra
note 9, at 200. If these relations could be considered intraenterprise, "competitors could sanc-
tify illicit agreements by exchanging a few hundred shares inter se." Id.
45. 334 U.S. at 116. A parent company and five of its wholly-owned subsidiaries used
their aggregate buying power to negotiate unreasonably favorable master agreements with
eight major film distributors. Id.
46. See Rahl, supra note 9, at 764 n.69.
47. 334 U.S. at 116. It should be noted that a § 1 amalgamation theory was not even
argued in Schine. The defendants were so sure the case would turn on a § 2 claim that they
dedicated only three of 230 pages of their brief to the single entity question. McQuade, supra
note 9 at 202. The opinion itself gave the issue only the few lines quoted in the text to support
the intraenterprise theory.
48. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
49. Id. at 212-14.
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merchandising unit."° As an additional twist, the Court noted that the
intraenterprise doctrine was especially applicable where the conspiring
units held themselves out to the public as competitors, 51 dictum that has
since been the subject of much debate.5 2
The intraenterprise issue arose again in Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States,53 which involved restrictive horizontal agreements be-
tween an American corporation and two foreign corporations in which
the former owned thirty and fifty percent interests respectively.54 The
Court upheld the district court's finding of a section 1 conspiracy. Most
commentators agree, however, that Timkin, along with Yellow Cab and
Schine Chain Theatres, turned on the fact that the initial combinations
were themselves created for anticompetitive purposes.55 These cases did
not provide a firm basis for a general intraenterprise doctrine.
It appeared that the intraenterprise doctrine was vindicated by Jus-
tice Black's opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., v. International Parts
Corp. 6 There, the Court found a section 1 conspiracy among a parent
corporation and its subsidiaries to impose various illegal restrictions on
50. Id. at 215. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court stating that "this sugges-
tion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate
corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws." Id. (citing United States v. Yellow Cab.
Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947)). Hence, the vitality of the intraenterprise doctrine was assumed.
Nor could the case have been decided on the Parke, Davis-Albrecht rationale, discussed supra
at note 34, because these cases had not yet been decided.
51. 340 U.S. at 215.
52. Few commentators embrace the "hold-out" concept. Professor Areeda, for example,
argues that such a claim in substance is for fraud and therefore not an antitrust concern.
Areeda, supra note 9, at 461. But cf. McQuade, supra note 9, at 213 (as to affiliates which "are
independent in all respects and do not achieve substantial added efficiencies because of their
integration [the rule] would be in keeping with the basic premises of an antitrust policy
designed to encourage the conditions of an effective competitive economy"; noting, however,
that the intraenterprise doctrine is a poor tool with which to achieve such a result. For cases
which have followed this rule, see infra note 68.
53. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
54. Id. at 595. In Timken, an American Company owned 30% of the stock of an English
corporation and 50% of the stock of a French corporation, each of which had substantially the
same name. These companies entered into traditional cartel type arrangements, including allo-
cating trade territories, fixing prices in the other's trade territory and generally protecting each
other's markets. Id. at 595-96.
55. Areeda, supra note 9, at 458; McQuade, supra note 9, at 194-95; Rahl, supra note 9, at
764-65 n.69; accord United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 520-23 (1948). One
commentator has adequately summarized the common view, stating that in Timken "there
was no corporate-subsidiary relation [or at the least] the combination was one formed for the
purpose of carrying on the prior illegal agreements. Both eliminate the case as authority for an
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine." McQuade, supra note 9, at 212 (footnote omitted). The
Copperweld Court agreed. 104 S. Ct. at 2739.
56. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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plaintiff franchisees.5 7 In no uncertain terms, Justice Black stated that
because the defendants "availed themselves of the privilege of doing busi-
ness through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could
not save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on sepa-
rate entities.""8 The Court also noted that the defendants could have
been held liable under section 1 for conspiracy between the petitioner
himself and Midas, or between Midas and other franchise dealers.5 9 The
Perma Life Court did not discuss the defense offered by the defendants-
significant to the Court in Kiefer-Stewart-that they had not held them-
selves out as competitors.' Under Perma Life, the intraenterprise doc-
trine appeared to be applicable in all cases in which the alleged
conspirators were separately incorporated.
Some have argued that the expansive rule of Perma Life was limited
by the Court's later decision in United States v. Citizens & Southern Na-
tional Bank.61 There, Citizens & Southern National Bank (Citizens) set
up a banking system in Georgia and retained only five percent of the
shares in each branch to avoid violating state law prohibiting branch
banking.62 As a practical matter, Citizens controlled these banks63 and
when Georgia amended its laws to permit branch banking, Citizens at-
tempted to acquire the banks' outstanding shares. The Justice Depart-
ment objected, claiming in part that the former relations between
Citizens and the branch banks constituted price fixing.'
The Court upheld the trial court's finding that the defendants had
57. Id. at 140-41. The plaintiffs were several franchise dealers of defendant Midas. The
other defendants were Midas' parent, International Parts Corporation, two other subsidiaries
of International Parts, and six individuals who were officers or agents of the corporation. Id.
at 135. The plaintiffs alleged as illegal restraints of trade certain provisions of Midas' franchise
agreements which precluded them from purchasing material from other sources, barred them
from selling outside their designated territories, tied their sale of mufflers to the sale of other
Midas products, and required them to sell at fixed prices. Id. at 137.
58. Id. at 141-42 (citing Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947)). The Seventh Circuit held
that the defendants were incapable of conspiring as a matter of law because they comprised a
"single business entity." The court noted that there was no evidence that the corporations
competed with each other or acted in any way other than as a fully integrated firm. Perma
Life, 376 F.2d 629, 694, 699 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
59. 392 U.S. 134, 142 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968) (dis-
cussed supra note 34)).
60. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
61. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
62. Id. at 91-93.
63. Citizens selected the principal executive officers, oversaw selection of their directors,
appointed one of its own executives to serve as an "advisory director," and generally provided
banking experience and expertise. Id.
64. 422 U.S. at 112.
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not fixed prices, stating that "the correspondent associate programs...
were permissible under the Sherman Act."65 Although this language has
been cited as requiring that a parent corporation actually control a sub-
sidiary in order for them to be treated as a single entity under section 1,66
a better interpretation is-that the defendants' conduct might have been
price fixing had they been competitors, but among more closely related
companies, the restraints were reasonable.67 In any event, it was not
clear what limits Citizens placed on the broad implications of Perma Life.
The ambiguity of these Supreme Court cases led to confusion in the
circuits about the correct standard to use to determine whether related
corporations could conspire under section 1. A few circuits latched on to
the "hold out" language found in Kiefer-Stewart,6" other circuits adopted
the strict separate incorporation rule of Perma Life,69 while a number of
circuits settled on an all-the-facts-and-circumstances test somewhat simi-
lar to the control test implied in Citizens.7" It was in the midst of this
65. Id. at 114.
66. See Note, 4 Suggested Standard, supra note 9, at 741-42.
67. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 35-37.
68. See, eg., Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980); Mutual
Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977); Aaron E.
Levine & Co. v. CalKraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039, 1042-46 (E.D. Mich. 1976); but cf.
Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting fact that parent and
subsidiary corporation did not compete or hold themselves as competitors was not dispositive
of conspiratorial capacity issue), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
69. In the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, see George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that swimming pool recirculation
manufacturer and affiliated merchandisers could conspire under § 1, and considered fact of
vertical integration evidence of conspiracy or agreement), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975);
Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976) (noting in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine is not limited to affiliated corporations that hold themselves
out as competitors, and finding that parent and wholly-owned subsidiaries had capacity to
conspire); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1978)
("The parent's choice of form is important. Having availed itself of separate incorporation
... marked it off as a distinct entity, and the antitrust laws treat it as such").
70. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had adopted an all-the-facts-and-circum-
stances standard on the premise that the capacity of separately incorporated but related corpo-
rations to conspire cannot be determined exclusively from the fact of separate incorporation.
See Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 319 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd
104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984) (decision below); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-
27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581,
589-90 (8th Cir. 1981); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1054 (9th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-
19 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d
795, 801-03 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
This test also has its specific pigeon holes. For example, one commentator has suggested
focusing more closely on day to day managerial control, because "when a parent corporation
creates, wholly owns, and controls the day-to-day operations of one or more subsidiary corpo-
rations, two or more independent 'minds' do not exist." See Note, A Suggested Standard,
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confusion that the Supreme Court heard Copperweld.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1972, Copperweld Corporation (Copperweld) purchased Regal
Tube Company (Regal), a manufacturer of steel tubing, from Lear Sie-
gler, Incorporated (LSI) which had operated Regal as an unincorporated
division.7" Under the sale agreement, LSI was bound not to compete
with Regal for five years.72 Copperweld then transferred Regal's assets
to a newly formed wholly-owned subsidiary, which continued to conduct
its manufacturing operations in Chicago but shared its corporate head-
quarters with Copperweld in Pennsylvania.73
Shortly before Copperweld bought Regal from LSI, Regal's presi-
dent, David Grohne, accepted a position with LSI. While working there,
Grohne set out to establish his own steel manufacturing business to com-
pete in the same market as Regal. 74 In May, 1972, Grohne formed Inde-
pendence Tube Corporation (Independence Tube), which then accepted
an offer from Yoder Company (Yoder) to supply a tubing mill. 7" Yoder
was to build a mill for Independence Tube by December, 1973. How-
ever, after executives at Copperweld and Regal learned of Grohne's
plans, they sent Yoder and others a letter warning that Copperweld
would be "greatly concerned if [Grohne] contemplated entering the
supra note 9, at 738. Another writer advocates a decision-making approach which would fo-
cus on the "pattern of decisionmaking within a business in order to determine when corporate
sub units are independent entities." See Note, A Decisionmaking Approach, supra note 9, at
1753-54. This proposition is similar to a rule recognized by some courts that, even given
conspiratorial capacity, related businesses will be considered one entity where a single deci-
sionmaker owns and runs both companies. See Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589
F.2d 4512, 457-58 (9th Cir. 1979); Las Vegas Drive-In Theatre, Inc., v. National Gen. Thea-
tres, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCI) 62,895 (D. Nev.); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 1346, 1358-59 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co.,
94 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Md. 1950), ajfd, 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951). Professor Areeda,
however, generally rejects an all-the-facts-and-circumstances approach: "[I]t makes little
sense to ascribe conspiratorial capacity to a corporate family when the enterprise's functional
character as a single economic unit is established by evidence of actual integration or, more
coherently, of unified power to control." Areeda, supra note 9, at 470 (emphasis added). In this
sense, it appears that Professor Areeda greatly influenced the thinking of the Coppenveld
Court. See text accompanying note 110.







structural tube market . . . in competition with Regal Tube."76 Two
days later, Independence Tube was forced to seek another builder and
did not receive its mill until September, 1974.11
Independence Tube's original complaint named Copperweld, Regal,
the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of both compa-
nies, and Yoder.78 The claims against the Chief Executive Officers were
dropped prior to trial, as was a section 2 allegation.79 The jury found
that Copperweld and Regal had conspired in violation of section 1, but
that Yoder was not part of that conspiracy.8
B. The Seventh Circuit's Opinion
Because Yoder had been exonerated by the jury, on appeal the Sev-
enth Circuit squarely faced the question of whether a parent corporation
could conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary. The court affirmed the
jury's verdict based on its previous approval of the intraenterprise doc-
trine in Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.,8 in which it had adopted an
all-the-facts-and-circumstances test to determine conspiratorial capacity
between related corporations.82 Although the appellate court questioned
the wisdom of subjecting a corporate subsidiary and its parent to anti-
trust liability when the same conduct by the corporation and its unincor-
porated division would escape liability,83 it held that the jury instructions
"took account of the proper factors for determining how much separa-
tion Copperweld and Regal in fact maintained in the conduct of their
businesses." 84 The court also found that there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to find that Regal was more like a separate corporate entity than
76. Id. The letter to Yoder was not Copperweld's only effort to discourage prospective
business contacts with Independence Tube. Copperweld also repeatedly contacted banks that
were considering financing Independence's operation, real estate firms that were considering
providing space to Independence, and prospective suppliers and customers. Id. at 2735.
77. Id. at 2734-35.
78. Id. at 2735.
79. Id.
80. Id. The trial court also found that Copperweld, but not Regal, had interfered with
Independence Tube's contract with Yoder; and that Regal, but not Copperweld, had interfered
with another contractual relationship. Id.
81. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
82. Id. at 726. In Photovest, a franchise of 15 drive-thru photofinishing kiosks brought a
treble damage antitrust action against its franchisor, Fotomat, under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act, among other claims. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff and awarded treble
damages. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating, in part, that it "must decide each
case on its particular facts" to determine when separate corporations are single enterprises
incapable of conspiring. Id.
83. 691 F.2d 310, 316-18 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. 104 S. Ct. at 2735-36. These factors included whether Copperweld and Regal had
separate management staffs, separate corporate officers, separate directors, separate records
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a mere arm of the parent.8"
C. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed, abolishing the intraenterprise doctrine
and the Seventh Circuit's single entity test to the extent each had applied
to conduct between parent corporations and their wholly-owned
subsidiaries.86
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger made it clear that
the Court had granted certiorari to reexamine the intraenterprise con-
spiracy doctrine because in no case had it considered the merits of the
doctrine in depth.87
The Court first traced the history of the intraenterprise doctrine in
its own decisions and methodically distinguished each case which had
been credited with developing or giving approval of the doctrine. The
Court distinguished Yellow Cab, the case which had "breathed life into
the intraenterprise doctrine,"88 as merely confirming the general rule that
a pattern of acquisition may itself create an illegal combination under
section 1, especially when the subsequent conduct of the defendants re-
flects an original anticompetitive purpose.8 9 In contrast, the intraenter-
prise concept addressed the subsequent conduct of legally formed
affiliates and subsidiaries. The Court further explained that in Yellow
Cab and Schine Chain Theatres, the Court also had found section 2 viola-
tions for attempted monopolization of local markets.90
The majority next admitted that Kiefer-Stewart gave direct support
to the intraenterprise doctrine.9" It maintained that the decision strayed
beyond Yellow Cab because it failed to "confront the anomalies an in-
and banking accounts, autonomy in setting policy, and so on. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at
2736 n.2.
85. 691 F.2d at 320.
86. 104 S. Ct. at 2736.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2737.
89. Id. (citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (plurality
opinion) (railroad stock acquisition which came into existence solely to suppress competition
between companies, held to violate § 1); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (191 1);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (trust holding company created
to bring together previously independent firms to lessen competition and obtain monopoly
power)). The Court distinguished United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944), discussed supra at note 44, on the same basis. 104 S. Ct. at 2737 nn.4 & 6.
90. Id. at 2738 & n.8. The Court also argued that Schine Chain Theatres and Griffith, see
supra note 44, today would be upheld on the theory that the parent company conspired with
independent distributors. Id.
91. Id at 2738.
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traenterprise doctrine entails,"9 2 concluding that had this case been de-
cided today, the same result could stand on the ground that Seagram's
subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other than the plaintiff.93
As for Timken and Perma Life, the two other cases in which the
Court had invoked the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, the majority
observed that these cases did little more than cite Yellow Cab and Kiefer-
Stewart.94 It further maintained that the intraenterprise doctrine was
unnecessary to the result in each. The Court explained that in Timken
"there was evidence that the stock acquisitions were themselves designed
to effectuate restrictive practices,"9" and that the American defendant
neither owned a "majority interest" in either of the foreign corporations
nor did it "control them."96 As for Perma Life, the Court observed that
the intraenterprise doctrine was merely an alternative section 1
holding.97
Having rid itself of this troubling precedent, the majority attacked
what it considered the anomalies of the intraenterprise doctrine. In dis-
cussing the distinction between concerted and independent action under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the majority explained that the
conduct of a single firm is governed by section 2 alone and that such
conduct is unlawful only when it threatens actual monopolization. 98 "It
is not enough that a single firm appears to 'restrain trade' unreasonably,
for even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression." 99
92. Id.
93. Id. The Court based this conclusion on two later cases in which it held that § I allega-
tions could be maintained by terminated distributors or franchisors who allege termination
conspiracy between the manufacturer and a non-terminated affiliated dealer. See Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50, & n.6 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960) (discussed supra note 34). But as the majority itself noted, Kiefer-Stewart was de-
cided in 1951 before these cases introduced the theory, hence this argument is not useful in
distinguishing that decision.
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2739. The Timken Court simply cited Kiefer-Stewart to show that "[t]he
fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liber-
ate them from the impact of the antitrust laws." See Timken, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (dis-
cussed supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text).
95. 104 S. Ct. at 2739. The Court agreed with most commentators, see supra note 55, that
Timken was not an intraenterprise case at all, but rather addressed a classic conspiracy or at
least something akin to a joint venture. Id.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2739.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2740.
99. Id. The Court also noted that § 2 does not forbid market power acquired as the result
of a "superior product" or "business acumen." Id. at n.14 (citing United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)); see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977) (antitrust laws protect "competition, not competitors") (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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The majority contrasted this with section 1 which was intended by
Congress only to reach "unreasonable restrains of trade effected by a
'contract, combination. . or conspiracy' between separate entities.""1°°
It explained that Congress decided to treat concerted behavior more
strictly than unilateral behavior because the former was inherently
fraught with anticompetitive risks.
It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of deci-
sionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their
own interests separately are combining to act as one for their
common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions
in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the
economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course,
such mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that
benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is suffi-
cient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient
monopoly. 101
After laying this theoretical groundwork, the majority discussed
how the distinction between sections 1 and 2 had long been recognized in
the courts. It noted that officers of a single firm could not conspire with
their corporations because they were "not separate economic actors pur-
suing separate economic interests,"'10 2 reasoning which also had been ap-
plied to employees of the same firm. 103 The Court also agreed with lower
courts that operations of a corporate enterprise organized into divisions
must be judged as the conduct of a single actor."° A division within a
corporate structure
pursues the common interests of the whole rather than interests
separate from those of the corporation itself . . . . Because
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2740 (emphasis in original). The Court cited Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 149 (1968), for the rule that § 1 does not reach conduct that is "wholly unilateral."
104 S. Ct. at 2740. It should be remembered, however, that the third-party conspirator in
Albrecht was separate both in the economic and legal sense as an independent newspaper car-
rier. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
101. 104 S. Ct. at 2741.
102. Id. (citing Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1007 (1982) and cases discussed supra note 5).
103. Id. The Court admitted that "it is true that a 'person' under the Act includes both an
individual and a corporation." However, it explained that § 1 does not declare every combina-
tion between two "persons" to be illegal. Id. at 2741 n.15. But see infra text accompanying
note 134 which shows that such language was included in the Act's original draft.
104. Id. at 2741-42 (citing Copperweld, 691 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1982) (decision below);
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1969); Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Inc., v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970)).
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coordination between a corporation and its division does not
represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of eco-
nomic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not an
activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny.I"5
When the Court finally considered whether a parent corporation
and its wholly-owned subsidiary possessed conspiratorial capacity, the
answer was academic; a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsid-
iary always had a "unity of purpose and common design."1 6 Based on
this presumption, the Court reasoned that a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary could not even have an illegal "meeting of the
minds" under the established definition of a section 1 conspiracy. 10 7 A
wholly-owned subsidiary and its parent were necessarily part of a single
"corporate consciousness"; hence, no conspiracy was possible between
them.108
The Court specifically noted that the scope of this "corporate con-
sciousness" is not limited by a parent corporation's actual control over
its wholly-owned subsidiary. It explained that "[t]hey share a common
purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary;
the parent may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to
act in the parent's best interests." 
10 9
The majority concluded that the Seventh Circuit's single entity test
was inadequate to preserve the Sherman Act's distinction between unilat-
eral and concerted conduct.' The Seventh Circuit's stress on various
control-oriented factors had missed the point; these factors were irrele-
vant to the question of whether the ultimate interests of the subsidiary
and the parent were identical.'' In the Court's view, any reading of the
Sherman Act which retained its distinctions between unilateral and con-
certed conduct must recognize that Congress intended that a mul-
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Court made reference here to the classic conspiracy definition given in Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946), see supra note 3, in which that
Court used the words a meeting of minds (emphasis added).
108. 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2742-43 n.18.
11I. Id. The Court also rejected the Perma Life Court's view outright, stating:
Because an "agreement" between a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary is no
more likely to be anticompetitive than an agreement between two divisions of a single
corporation, it does not matter that the parent "availed [itself] of the privilege of
doing business through separate corporations. . . ." The purposeful choice of a par-
ent corporation to organize a subunit as a subsidiary is not itself a reason to heighten
antitrust scrutiny, because it is not laden with anticompetitive risk.
Id. at 2743 n.19 (citation omitted).
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ticorporate enterprise could restrain trade in an intraenterprise setting to
the same extent that it could if it were one single firm.112 Copperweld
and its subsidiary could restrain trade without fear of violating section
1.113
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall joined. 1 4 The dissenters would have preferred reten-
tion of a rule of reason1 15 approach to the conspiratorial capacity issue
rather than the per se rule adopted by the majority. According to the
dissent, the anomaly was clear: by invoking a per se approach, the ma-
jority condoned the free use of corporate subsidiaries to eliminate compe-
tition, one of the chief evils to which the Sherman Act was addressed. 16
Although the dissent readily admitted that section 1 was not in-
tended to scrutinize efficient intraenterprise conduct, which may have the
effect of eliminating competition, 7 it pointed out that Copperweld and
Regal's conduct had little to do with efficient integration. Copperweld
and Regal had purposefully and successfully delayed Independence
Tube's entry into the steel tubing market through the coercion of Inde-
pendence Tube's customers and bankers.1" This type of exclusionary
conduct, the dissent maintained, was "plainly distinguishable from verti-
cal integration designed to achieve competitive efficiencies. ' 19
The dissent rejected the majority's treatment of the precedent that
had established the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. It noted that
even if Yellow Cab and Schine Chain Theatres could be distinguished on
their alternative holdings, these cases actually rested on a section 1 con-
spiracy theory among related defendants. 20 Neither was the dissent im-
pressed with the majority's attempt to distinguish Kiefer-Stewart on the
112. Id. at 2744.
113. Id.
114. 104 S. Ct. at 2745 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 3 for a discussion of the "rule of
reason" approach which focuses on anticompetitive effect in determining the illegality of cer-
tain conduct.
116. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Stevens, 3., dissenting). See supra note 76.
119. 104 S. Ct. at 2746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. 104 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the Yellowv
Cab Court had specifically stated that the "the restraints imposed by the corporate parent on
the affiliates that it already owned in themselves violated § 1." Id. at 2747 (citing United




ground that if it had been decided today a different theory might have
been used. The dissent pointed out that in Kiefer-Stewart, Seagram had
unsuccessfully argued that Yellow Cab was limited to cases concerning
unlawful acquisitions. 12'
The dissent stressed the majority's failure to discuss the clear words
of Timken' 22 and of Perma Life, in which the Court established the rule
that where an enterprise availed itself of the privilege of using corporate
subsidiaries it would not be saved from the obligations the law placed on
separate entities, despite common ownership.'23 This, the dissent ar-
gued, is where the inquiry into conspiratorial capacity should end.'24
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine's forty-year development
and Congress' failure to challenge it, buttressed the dissent's argument
that the language of section 1 should be viewed broadly.'25 The activities
of what had become known as "trusts" in 1890's, it observed, were of
special concern to the makers of the Sherman Act.'26
As to economic theory, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
presumption that there was an economic rationale behind a plurality of
actors requirement under section 1. It argued that the dual person re-
quirement was a consequence of plain statutory language rather than
economic principles, stating that "[a]s an economic matter, what is criti-
121. Id. at 2748 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2748 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Timken Court had stated:
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that agree-
ments between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition
among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project a "joint ven-
ture." Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain trade could be so
labeled.
341 U.S. at 598 (cited by the dissent at 104 S. Ct. 2748 n.5). This reference, however, gives just
as much support to the majority's view that Timken simply involved an illegal initial combina-
tion which is distinct from an intraenterprise theory. See supra note 55.
123. 104 S. Ct. at 2748 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968)).
124. Id. at 2750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2751 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted Senator Sherman's remarks:
Because these combinations are always in many States. . .it will be very easy for
them to make a corporation within a State. So they can; but that is only one corpora-
tion of the combination. The combination is always of two or more. . . all bound
together by a link which holds them together, in the name of trustees, who are them-
selves incorporated under the laws of one of the States.
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. It can
control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish inter-
ests.. .. It is the kind of competition we have to deal with now.
Id. at 2751 (quoting 21 CONG. Rac. 2569, 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)). How-
ever, the Senator appears to have addressed these statements to the jurisdiction debate. See
infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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cal is the presence of market power, rather than a plurality of actors."' 127
Even assuming there was an economic rationale underlying section
1, the dissent believed that the intraenterprise doctrine had an economic
justification: It reached "anticompetitive agreements between affiliated
corporations which have sufficient market power to restrain marketwide
competition, but not sufficient power to be considered monopolistic
within the ambit of § 2 of the Act." 128  Although a single firm is not
expected to compete with itself or forego efficient production of expan-
sion, the intraenterprise doctrine served to scrutinize intraenterprise con-
duct unrelated to such procompetitive conduct. '29
The question not answered by the majority, the dissent concluded,
was why should two corporations that engage in a predatory course of
conduct, which as separate legal entities could easily fit within section 1,
be immunized from liability because they are controlled by the same
"godfather?" 130
IV. ANALYSIS
A. An Economic Enterprise Approach to Conspiring Entities
The question addressed in Copperweld is one that has troubled
courts ever since the Sherman Act was enacted. In determining conspir-
atorial capacity under section 1, should courts focus on distinct legal per-
sons, as Justice Black concluded in Perma Life, or should courts focus on
separate economic entities, as the Court did in Copperweld?
1. Legislative history
To answer this question, the first inquiry is into the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act, especially because both the majority and the
dissent in Copperweld claimed legislative approval of their respective po-
sitions on the conspiratorial capacity issue. 31 The majority's view, that
127. Id. at 2752 (Stevens, J.,.dissenting) (footnote omitted).
128. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the intraenterprise doctrine is best
seen as "a forceful weapon [that] would be available to the government with which to chal-
lenge conduct which in oligopolistic industries creates or reinforces entry barriers." Id. at n.22
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting L. SULLIvAN, supra note 3, at 324). The dissent further
explained that from a competitive standpoint, the decision of a single firm to exercise monop-
oly power has the same consequences as two firms acting together, as in an agreement not to
compete. Id. at 2752 & n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960) (quotation omitted)).
129. Id. at 2755 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Compare id. at 2744 & n.24 in which the majority argues that Congress made a pur-
poseful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct, with id. at
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a wholly-owned subsidiary should be shielded from scrutiny under sec-
tion 1 except when acquired or formed for anticompetitive purposes, is
supported by these words of Senator Sherman:
It is said that this bill will interfere with lawful trade, with
the customary business of life. I deny it.
This bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital
and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but
only to prevent and control combinations made with a view to
prevent competition. . .. It is unlawful combination. . . that
is aimed at by the bill, and not the lawful and useful
combination. 132
Other excerpts from the legislative record lend indirect support to
the dissent's argument that Congress never intended for section 1 to ex-
clude all anticompetitive single enterprise conduct. 133 For example, at
one point in the debates, Senator Hoar had this exchange with Senator
Sherman.
Mr. HOAR:
I do not understand why Senator Sherman has inserted in
the bill the language of the first few lines, confining his penalty
to citizens or corporations of different States. . . . I suppose it
was prepared with some idea . . . that contracts between citi-
zens. . . of different States were necessarily commerce between
those States, and that this was essential to bring the proposed
statute within the constitutional power of Congress ....
However, [t]his bill must stand, if at all, upon the fact that
it is a bill to protect what is described alone, and that is the
importation, transportation, or sale of articles [in interstate
commerce].
Mr. SHERMAN:
In the bill as originally draughted [sic] by myself I did not
insert the words "between two or more citizens or
corporations."
. . . [T]hese words were inserted with a view to confine
2751 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which the dissent argues that Congress intended for § I
to extend beyond acquisitions of corporate affiliates or § 1 would not apply to trusts and
combinations.
132. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
133. 104 S. Ct. at 2751 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the operation of the bill to contracts made between citizens or
corporations of different States, so as not to invade, by possibil-
ity, the jurisdiction of the courts of the States. 134
Thus, as originally amended, the express two party requirement of sec-
tion 1 was based on a jurisdictional concern1 35 rather than on a desire to
shield single enterprise conduct from section 1 scrutiny. No two person
requirement can be implied from the legislative history alone.
The dissent's view is further supported by Congress' objective of re-
ducing the anticompetitive effects of trust formation. 136  Senator Sher-
man explained the underlying policy goal, stating that Congress should
aim "to preserve freedom of trade and production, the natural competi-
tion of increasing production, [and] the lowering of prices by such
competition."
' 137
The dissent's focus on congressional objectives in 1890, however, ul-
timately reveals the weakness of its argument. The dissent strains to
equate the 51st Congress' concern with trust formation to its own con-
cern with the anticompetitive conduct of modern multicorporate enter-
prises. The critical difference is that in 1890 Congress did not confront
the problem of anticompetitive conduct between members of legally
formed trusts; this would be the subject, in part, of the Fair Trade Com-
mission Act of 1914.138 Rather, the problem addressed by the Sherman
Act in 1890 was the initial combination of distinct economic entities into
single trusts for the purpose of limiting the competition that would have
existed in competitive markets. This focus on initial trust formation is
analogous to the majority's treatment of Yellow Cab and Timken, both of
which involved combinations made for anticompetitive purposes. 139
Conversely, Copperweld involved the conduct of legally combined, mul-
134. 21 CONG. REc. 2567 (1890) (statements of Sens. Hoar and Sherman) (emphasis
added).
135. The jurisdictional problem related to the issue of whether Congress' powers under the
commerce clause required the actual transportation of goods. Senator George of Mississippi
was particularly concerned about infringing on the police powers of the state. Id. at 1460
(statement of Sen. George). Hence, the assumption that trusts necessarily included corpora-
tions located in different states led to the discussion of using diversity as an alternative consti-
tutional and jurisdictional basis for the Act. Senator Sherman supported this view. Id. at 2569
(statement of Sen. Sherman). The Act's original multiparty language was apparently deleted
when it was decided that Congress' commerce clause powers extended to conduct addressed by
the Act.
136. See supra note 126.
137. H. THORELLI, supra note 19, at 168-69 (quoting Sen. Sherman) (emphasis omitted).
138. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.




The congressional record indicates that Congress intentionally made
the Sherman Act vague so that courts could create a federal common law
unique to the development of American business.1 "' The issue of the
conspiratorial capacity of affiliated corporations only arose when busi-
ness structures became more complex than the common trust or classic
combination.1 4 1 Until the Court decided Copperweld, the judiciary had
yet to fully address the issue.
2. Is there a role for the intraenterprise doctrine?
The intraenterprise doctrine is an attempt to address the anticompe-
titive effects of single firm conduct that does not also threaten monopoli-
zation. 143 Such conduct is said to fall within the "gap" between sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."4 Since 1890, Congress has attempted to
fill this gap with legislation, 45 and it has always been the subject of un-
fair competition at common law. 146
140. Independence Tube did not allege that Copperweld's acquisition of Regal was unlaw-
ful. See supra notes 78-79.
141. P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 48-49; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 161. At the con-
gressional hearings, when asked why Congress should bother denouncing monopoly when it
was already prohibited at common law, Senator Hoar replied: "Because there is not any com-
mon law of the United States." 21 CONG. RIc. 3146, 3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar)
(cited in P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 49 n.9). See also 21 CONG. Rnc. 2460 (1890) ("I admit
that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful
combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case.") (state-
ment of Sen. Sherman). In sum, Congress borrowed common law principles to create the
Sherman Act but left it to the courts to create new common law in applying the Act.
142. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 29.
144. See 104 S. Ct. at 2744-45.
145. In 1914, Congress established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as an independent
regulating agency to administer the Federal Trade Commission Act, Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch.
311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)). Section 5 of the Act
declared unlawful "unfair methods of competition." Id. In 1938, this was amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to include "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Act of March 21,
1938, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982). The Act's scope
is substantively broad. For example, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-
44 (1972), the Supreme Court held that § 5 empowers the FTC "to define and proscribe an
unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the
spirit of the antitrust laws" and to prosecute "practices [which are] unfair or deceptive in their
effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as competitive practices or their
effect on competition." Id. at 239. One drawback of the Act for private plaintiffs is that an
FTC case must be in the "public's" interest and not simply involve a dispute between two
competitors. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929). The FTC is empowered to enforce a
variety of other trade regulation acts. See generally, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 3, at 276 and ch. V.
146. States tend to have very liberal common law rules protecting persons from unfair coin-
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An underlying policy question in Copperweld, therefore, concerns
the wisdom of the judiciary using section 1 to combat anticompetitive
single firm conduct. The dissent in Copperweld claimed that Congress
impliedly approved of this use by not repudiating the doctrine with legis-
lation.147 But one should not assume that Congress had impliedly ap-
prove of a doctrine which not even the courts could define and which had
resulted in costly unpredictability. 48
The greatest risk caused by the intraenterprise doctrine is that it
may limit procompetitive conduct of single enterprises. Retaining a rule
of reason approach, as the dissent suggests, does not provide a solution.
It is impracticable to develop section 1 standards which apply concur-
rently to competitors and to single firms. To be sure, if a conspiracy can
exist in a single firm setting, then simple intrafirm agreements and poli-
cies may be used to show evidence of conspiracy.14 9 This potential neces-
sarily reduces a firm's incentive to coordinate the activities of its
subsidiaries for procompetitive purposes. The Copperweld decision is the
Court's acknowledgment that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine has
led to more confusion than competition.
3. Rejecting legal formalism
The Court's rejection of the intraenterprise concept puts to rest the
inconsistency of basing conspiratorial capacity purely on separate incor-
poration, as Justice Black proposed in Perma Life. As one commentator
has noted:
[T]he Sherman Act [has been characterized] as a "charter of
economic freedom." Absent some compelling reason to the
contrary, therefore, it might reasonably be expected that eco-
nomic fact should prevail over legal fiction, and that freedom to
adopt the most economical form of business organization
would be encouraged.
.. . It seems inconceivable that the philosophy "you can't
have your cake and eat it" should be permitted to twist a "char-
ter of economic freedom" into a device to compel businessmen
petition, although a survey of these rules is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally 2 F.
CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES §§ 2.01-2.08 (4th ed.
1981).
147. 104 S. Ct. at 2749 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. As the majority points out, only Kiefer-Stewart squarely rested on the intraenterprise
doctrine, and today it could be sustained on an alternative § 1 theory. Id. at 2738-39. The
obfuscation of §§ 1 and 2 caused by the doctrine's continued existence is not warranted by
such marginal returns.
149. See Areeda, supra note 9, at 452.
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to forego desirable forms of corporate organization without any
offsetting gain to the competitive nature of our economy. 150
Although the Copperweld Court adopted the above economic rationale, it
remains troubling that Independence Tube was denied the same "eco-
nomic freedom" in entering the steel tube market that Copperweld en-
joyed in transforming its division into a subsidiary. In this sense, the
Court's rejection of Perma Life's legal formalism is replaced by an eco-
nomic rationale that is no less formalistic in its favoring multicorporate
organization at the expense of market entry. Ultimately, the Court
placed its faith in the effectiveness of non-treble damage remedies to pro-
tect the economic freedom of competitors who are injured by the unilat-
eral conduct of firms that do not possess monopoly power.151
4. Copperweld's "economic enterprise"
The Court avoided the need to give a thorough definition of a single
economic enterprise by limiting the scope of its holding to wholly-owned
subsidiaries.' 52 Nevertheless, in more complex factual cases, lower
courts will base their understanding of a single enterprise on what can be
understood from Copperweld.
The most novel aspect of the Court's reasoning is its introduction of
the concept of the "corporate consciousness,"' 53 which is the overall
mind of a single enterprise.' 4 If a subsidiary or an affiliate is deemed to
be a part of the same corporate consciousness as the parent corporation,
any agreements flowing between them will merely be considered internal
150. Sprunk, supra note 9, at 27-28. The same writer states it is self-evident that a parent
corporation and its subsidiaries are single economic units. Id. at 26 n.18 (citing Schwartz,
Relations with Affiliated Customers, ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 214, 214-15 (1953)); see
also Rah, supra note 9, at 767; Adelman, Effective Competition and Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 1289, 1315 n.96 (1948).
151. See 104 S. Ct. at 2745. Although the effectiveness of § 5 of the FTC Act and state
unfair competition laws in reducing unilateral trade restraints is beyond the scope of this Note,
the question is critical in today's oligopolistic markets. A § 2 solution is also ill-advised. See
generally Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophy-
lactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. Rnv. 373, 411-13, 450-52 (1974) (warning of ill
effects on a firm's pro-competitive conduct if expansion of § 2 is undertaken to deal with in-
traenterprise restraints of trade).
152. The Court stated:
We limit our inquiry to the narrow issue squarely presented: whether a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a parent may
be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.
104 S. Ct. at 2740 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 2742.
154. Id.
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transmissions not subject to section 1 scrutiny. 155
The Court first explained this enterprise theory through negative
implication. By rejecting the Perma Life rule, the Court established that
economic substance rather than corporate form is the proper focus for
the conspiratorial capacity question. But the factors considered by the
Court in determining the economic substance of an intraenterprise rela-
tionship are somewhat vague. These include whether the related corpo-
rations had a "unity of purpose and common design" 156 or whether the
parent corporation had the power to change its subsidiary into a divi-
sion.157 Other language in the decision points to a standard based on the
lack of independent centers of decision making; that is, whether ultimate
economic decisions of the firm are guided by only one person or group. I 8
Collectively, this language amounts to a single enterprise standard re-
quiring that the parent have the ultimate power to guide the economic
forces of the subsidiary; and similarly, that the subsidiary have the same
economic objectives as the parent.
The Court's statement that the parent corporation need not exercise
its ownership power reveals the expansive scope of its enterprise theory.
The Court noted:
[A parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary]
are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle
under the control of a single driver.
[T]hey share a common purpose whether or not the parent
keeps a tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full
control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the par-
ent's best interests.15 9
Thus, an agreement among members of the same corporate con-
sciousness cannot violate section 1 regardless of how little control the
parent corporation exerts over its subsidiary. Similarly, conduct that
could have been considered a per se violation under the intraenterprise
doctrine would, under the Court's reasoning, be considered mere efficient
internal arrangements. The Court's adoption of an economic enterprise
theory implies much more than its narrow holding suggests.
155. Id. at 2742-44. See supra text accompanying note 108.
156. Id. at 2742. The Court borrowed this language from the classic definition of § 2 con-
spiracy given by the Court in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810
(1946).





B. Copperweld's Impact on Other Single Entity Concepts
A variety of theories in the circuits are used to determine if and
when a parent corporation and its subsidiaries or affiliates should be con-
sidered separate entities under section 1.160 Now that the Copperweld
Court has clearly adopted an economic enterprise approach to conspira-
torial capacity, these theories need to be reexamined.
1. "Single economic units"
Prior to Copperweld, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, seek-
ing to elevate substance over form, had adopted an all-the-facts-and-cir-
cumstances test to determine if related corporations were a single
economic unit. 161 This approach encompasses a great variety of factors,
including the presence of a single decisionmaker, 162 the existence of con-
solidated financial statements and tax returns,163 common officers and
employees,' 64 common directors, 165 and common day-to-day control of
operations. 166
Of these factors, only the single decisionmaker rule is consistent
with the Copperweld Court's emphasis on the power to control economic
forces.' 67 But too much focus on a single decisionmaking approach
might result in a narrow application of Copperweld in the courts below.
It should not matter that more than one person or group actually makes
the decisions concerning the channeling of economic forces, as long as
the ultimate power is similarly consolidated. The sole decisionmaker
rule should, however, play a more important role in considering the con-
spiratorial capacity between a corporation and a minority held
subsidiary.'
68
160. See supra notes 68-70.
161. See cases cited supra note 70.
162. See, e.g., Las Vegas Sun v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); see also Note, A DecisionmakingApproach, supra note 9, at 1753-
54.-
163. See, eg., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980).
164. See cases cited at supra note 70.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); see also Note, A Suggested Stan-
dard, supra note 9, at 739-40.
167. See P. AREEDA, supra note 3, at 470-73 (discussing how other factors do not relate to
ultimate decisionmaking power).
168. See infra text accompanying note 192.
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a. the "outsider rule"
A lingering concept in the all-the-facts-and-circumstances determi-
nation has been the proposition that courts should ascertain whether the
conduct of the related corporations adversely affects third parties.
1 69
This theory has long been criticized. 170 The idea is questionable because
regardless of its legality all conduct of a single firm eventually affects
third parties. This approach puts a misplaced focus on the nature of the
restraint rather than on conspiratorial capacity.' 71 Nevertheless, the
concept has consistently appeared in court opinions.
172
The outsider concept is simply inconsistent with the reasoning in
Copperweld. The Court made it clear that a single economic firm is per-
mitted to unilaterally restrain trade subject only to section 2 of the Sher-
man Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. 173 A concept which emphasizes
anticompetitive effect should play no part in determining conspiratorial
capacity.
2. The "hold out" doctrine
In rejecting Kiefer-Stewart, the Copperweld Court also impliedly re-
jected the concept that a conspiracy to restrain trade could depend on
whether the related defendants had held themselves out as competitors.
Because this concept is irrelevant to the question of whether related cor-
porations have a unity of purpose and objectives or whether they are
guided by the same corporate consciousness, it should no longer be con-
169. See cases cited infra note 172.
170. The consensus is that such a standard would erroneously expose otherwise permissible
unilateral restraints of single firms by focusing on competitive impact rather than on conspira-
torial capability. An outsiders rule provides no guidance to determine whether the alleged
anticompetitive effect is illegal because it is similar to that of a conspiracy among independent
competitors, or whether it is legal because the Sherman Act permits the same kind of conduct
in a single enterprise setting. See Handler & Smart, supra note 9, at 49-5 1; Willis & Pitofsky,
supra note 9, at 49, McQuade, supra note 9, at 213.
171. See supra note 170.
172. Some circuits, however, including the Third, have recognized the effect on outsiders
concept. See, eg., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579
F.2d 20, 32 (3d Cir.) (noting possible exception if concerted action relates solely to internal
management of a safe form and does not restrain external competition), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978); accord Thomsen v. Western Electric Co., 512 F. Supp. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Cal
1981); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841, 859-
60 (W.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981); Handguards, Inc. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Report of The Attorney General's National Com-
mittee To Study the Antitrust Laws 34 (1955) (only if intended to cause or result in coercive
undue restraint on their customers or competitors); see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 328
(drawing same distinction).
173. 104 S. Ct. at 2745.
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sidered by the courts.174
While it has little relevance to the corporate consciousness, the
holdout concept may nevertheless be attractive to courts facing the ques-
tion of conspiratorial capacity among affiliates. These sub-units, when
viewed apart from the common parent, are less likely to carry with them
the assumption of procompetitive integration.
175
C. Problems Raised by the Decision
1. What about conspiring affiliates?
Because the Copperweld decision is limited to parent corporations
and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, the question of whether affiliated
corporations can conspire in violation of section 1 has been left to the
circuits.
Section 1 plaintiffs may attempt to distinguish Copperweld on sev-
eral grounds. First and most obvious is the fact that the Copperweld
Court expressly left this question undecided.' 76 This could be inferred to
mean that the Court was unwilling to extend the single enterprise con-
cept that far. Plaintiffs could also argue that the intraenterprise concept
should still apply to those affiliates which are independent in all respects
and which do not achieve substantial efficiencies despite their having a
common parent.
Since Copperweld, however, lower courts have generally accepted
the broad implications of the Court's adoption of an enterprise theory
and have unanimously held that related affiliates cannot conspire under
section 1.177 In Century Oil Tool Inc. v. Production Specialities, Inc.,17
the Fifth Circuit held that two corporations under common ownership
174. See supra note 52. Whether these companies otherwise violate trade regulation laws
may be another matter. The FTC Act is particularly applicable in this settling. As noted at
supra note 146, the FTC is given broad powers under the commerce clause to enforce various
trade regulation acts. A few old FTC cases support the hold out concept. See, eg., FTC v. A.
A. Berry Seed Co., 2 F.T.C. 427 (1920); FTC v. Armour & Co., 1 F.T.C. 430 (1919); FTC v.
Fleischmann Co., 1 F.T.C. 119 (1918).
175. Although a subsidiary and its parent corporation may be presumed to achieve pro-
competitive efficiencies through various integrations of capital, labor and management, this
presumption does not necessarily exist as between affiliates. Affiliates are much less likely to
share resources to decrease their respective production costs.
176. See supra note 152.
177. See Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66, 136 (1984); Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Insurance Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,
163 (1984); Hizel & Sons, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., No. 83-K-1743, slip op. at
n.2 (D. Col. 1984) ("Although the Court's holding does not explicitly preclude allegations of a
conspiracy between two sister corporations . . . the Court's rationale does apply to such
situations.").
178. 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH % 66,136 (1984).
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and control of three individuals were incapable of conspiring under sec-
tion 1.179 The court reasoned that a contract among them did not join
formerly distinct economic units, and, in reality, the defendants had a
unity of purpose and common design.180 The court concluded that there
was "no relevant difference between a corporation wholly owned by an-
other corporation, two corporations wholly owned by a third corporation
or two corporations wholly owned by three persons who together man-
age[d] all affairs of the two corporations."' 1 Soon after that case, the
Fifth Circuit held that wholly-owned affiliates could not conspire among
themselves regardless of whether the common parent corporation was a
defendant. 182
None of these lower courts considered whether the affiliated corpo-
rations had held themselves out as competitors or whether agreements
between them had adversely affected third parties. This suggests that
these concepts have been extinguished by the expansive enterprise rea-
soning of the Copperweld Court.'83
2. Partially-owned subsidiaries and affiliates
The majority's decision in Copperweld rests on the assumption that a
wholly-owned subsidiary has a unity of purpose and a common design
with its parent, regardless of the form in which the subsidiary is created
179. Id. at 66,371.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Insurance Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,163 at
518 (1984).
183. The issue of whether it is illegal for a firm to sell a product to its subsidiary below
market prices should also be resolved by extending the Copperweld holding. Under § 2(a) of
the Clayton Act it is "unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . . to discriminate in
price between different purchases of commodities of like grade and quality." 15 U.S.C. 13(a)
(1982) (as amended by § I of the Robinson Patman Act, ch. 592 § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)).
Prior to Copperweld, circuits differed as to the circumstances under which a subsidiary would
be considered a "purchaser" under the Act. See, e.g., Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates
Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cir. 1979) ("transfers from a parent corporation to its
wholly-owned subsidiary corporation can never be considered separate sales to a favored cus-
tomer"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1980). Cf Parish v. Cox, 586 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1978)
(approving a standard that precludes a wholly-owned subsidiary from being a "purchaser"
under the Act if parent corporation "controls" subsidiary); Brown v. Hansen Publications,
Inc., 556 F.2d 969, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1977) (also emphasizing control but noting overlapping
officers, directors, employees, payroll and taxes as examples of its exercise). Given the Cop-
perweld Court's holding that a parent corporation and its subsidiary cannot even have an ille-
gal meeting of minds in the § 1 sense, it is reasonable to conclude, as did the Fifth Circuit, that
neither can it have an illegal agreement in the price discrimination sense. It is suggested here
that this price discrimination issue should mirror the extension of Copperweld to partially-
owned subsidiaries because both deal with shielding internal agreements of firms from antitrust
scrutiny.
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or the extent to which the parent asserts its inherent power to control the
subsidiary's policies. The issue of conspiratorial capacity becomes more
complex when a parent corporation is related to a subsidiary through
partial ownership. The Copperweld Court expressly avoided the applica-
tion of its reasoning to this issue.
18 4
In distinguishing precedent, however, the Court suggested what
level of ownership or control might indicate the existence of two separate
enterprises. In discussing Timken, the majority dismissed the applica-
tion of the intraenterprise doctrine because the parent corporation "did
not own a majority interest [in the subsidiaries and] did not control
them."' 85 This comment implies that a firm's "corporate consciousness"
could extend to include those entities in which the parent owns a major-
ity interest, or possibly to entities over which the parent has actual
control.
Interestingly, Professor Areeda, the primary advocate of an eco-
nomic enterprise approach in situations involving 100 percent ownership,
recommends falling back into the quagmire of an all-the-facts-and-cir-
cumstances standard in situations involving less than complete
ownership:
When ownership is not completely in common, courts
must face additional issues, such as the relative weight to be
given de facto as compared with de jure control, the existence
of contracts between related corporations when direction is in-
sufficient to assure operational control, the possible significance
of the controlling party's duties to the minority interests, and
the market characteristics of the other owners who may be
otherwise unrelated competitors of the controlling party.186
However, in light of the majority's quick rejection of this factually inclu-
sive test as used by the Seventh Circuit in its application to wholly-owned
subsidiaries, courts should not necessarily follow Professor Areeda's lead
in this area.
This Note proposes that there is no reason to differentiate between
100 percent ownership of a subsidiary and majority ownership in deter-
mining conspiratorial capacity under section 1. As one writer has sug-
gested, "as long as the parent holds more than 50 percent, control is
being exercised through ownership rather than through an agree-
184. See supra note 152.
185. 104 S. Ct. at 2739 (citing United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284,
311-12 (W.D. Ohio 1949), modified, 314 U.S. 593 (1951)).
186. Areeda, supra note 9, at 452 n.3.
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ment." '187 This tracks the Copperweld Court's reliance on the fact that
Copperweld, through its ownership power, could have made Regal a di-
vision-not subject to section 1-at any time. 8' More importantly, a
corporation which is majority owned by another necessarily has a unity
of purpose and common design, and agreements between them would not
join formally distinct economic forces. A majority interest rule would
also provide needed certainty in an area in which courts, businesses, and
plaintiffs are confused by the inconsistent single enterprise tests.
Only one court has addressed the partially-owned subsidiary issue
since Copperweld. In Magnum Force Distributors v. Bon Bon Co. of
America, Inc.,89 a New York district court dismissed a section 1 claim,
reasoning that a corporation is incapable as a matter of law of conspiring
with a firm it controls through a sixty percent ownership interest. 190 This
rationale is consistent with a rule establishing a majority interest as the
single enterprise boundary under section 1.191
a. minority holdings
The most difficult area remaining after Copperweld involves agree-
ments between corporations and companies in which the former owns a
minority interest, or agreements between similar affiliates. It should be
assumed initially that a minority interest holding should not be given the
187. See McQuade, supra note 9, at 212 (the writer also emphasizes actual control).
188. 104 S. Ct. at 2743. This line of analysis does not address the statutory limits placed on
a parent company's power to convert its divisions into subsidiaries. Nor does it matter that the
parent company cannot convert them, as long as the power to control the affiliate remains.
189. No. 84-2629 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (order dismissing § 1 claim).
190. Id.
191. This rule would preclude the extension of the Court's reasoning in Copperweld to third
parties or sports leagues because in neither situation is there overlapping ownership between
the potential defendants. The issue of conspiratorial capacity between corporations and third
parties was resolved by the Copperweld Court's express approval of Albrecht v. Harold & Co.,
390 U.S. 145 (1968). 104 S. Ct. at 2740. See also supra note 5.
The question of conspiratorial capacity among franchised sports leagues is more complex.
Teams probably will latch on to the Copperweld Court's language of a "unity of purpose and
common design" and argue that a league should be considered a single entity under § 1. How-
ever, it cannot be disputed that generally there is no overlapping ownership among franchises
in a league and that agreements among them do combine economic forces that previously
pursued separate interests. For a thorough discussion of Copperweld's application to sports
leagues, see Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Profes-
sional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 167 (1984). The author notes that most professional
sports teams are "separately incorporated ... [and] separately owned and [therefore] do not
share a complete unity of interest or a single corporate consciousness." He further observes
that leagues are at best like unconventional joint ventures and should be subject to §1 under
the rule of reason. Id. at 171. See also Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as
a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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same presumption of non-conspiratorial capacity as that of a majority
holder. A minority interest holder does not necessarily have the same
economic objectives as the other interest holders, nor could it by right
control the other interests if it wished.
A fair rule would apply a presumption of conspiratorial capacity to
corporations in which the parent has a minority interest, rebuttable only
if the parent shows that it has actual decisionmaking power and con-
trol.192 This would remain consistent with Copperweld's emphasis on
the power to control. As a practical matter, placing the burden of proof
on the controlling parent would be fair because of the parent's access to
the relevant evidence, and because of the presumption of non-conspirato-
rial capacity in the parent's favor when it owns more than fifty percent of
a subsidiary.
D. Corporate Liability: Unravelling the Corporate Veil
A final question should be asked in light of Copperweld. Is it logical
or fair to permit enterprises to avoid all antitrust scrutiny under section 1
because they are one "corporate consciousness," yet continue to allow
the parent company of an enterprise to avoid the liabilities of its subsidi-
aries simply because of their separate incorporation?
After the development of corporations, the principle developed that
a shareholder's liability should be limited to promote the continued use
of the corporate structure. 193 Once the law changed so that corporations
could acquire stock in other corporations, 194 the issue arose as to
whether these sub-units, like other shareholders, would be protected
from the liabilities of their related corporations. Courts, not taking note
of any distinction between shareholder liability and intracorporate liabil-
ity, assumed that the sub-units were protected. 195 When courts devel-
oped identity rules196 to find shareholders liable for corporate acts under
192. This is similar to one standard that has been suggested for all intraenterprise problems.
See Note, A Decisionmaking Approach, supra note 9.
193. See generally P. BLUMBERG, supra note 18, at 3; 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2824-26, 2835 (rev. perm. ed. 1968); Note, Power of
a Corporation to Acquire Stock ofAnother Corporation, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 281,284-86 (193 1).
194. See supra note 193.
195. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 18, at 4-5. The writer noted that the effect of treating cor-
porations like shareholders is really "limited liability within 'limited liability' " because the
parent receives "limited liability on its investment in the subsidiary, in addition to the limited
liability the ultimate investor receives on his or her investment in the parent." Id. at 5 & n.9
(citing E. LAITY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 192-221 (1936)). But see
Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837,
871-76, 900-01 (1936).
196. The history of the various alter ego doctrines that have developed over the years is
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certain dictates of equity, these same standards were applied to corporate
subsidiaries.197
Writers and courts have recently begun to recognize that corporate
subsidiaries should not be treated exactly like shareholders. The trend is
to replace the old identity rules with enterprise theory:
Legal scholars increasingly understand that the objectives and
policies of the law are often more adequately served by relating
legal consequences to the enterprise than by relying primarily
on legal concepts. This development-in areas as diverse as
torts, antitrust, jurisdiction and venue-relates legal conse-
quences to the enterprise that has created them.'98
An enterprise theory alternative to piercing the corporate veil is not
novel. Several decades ago, Professor A. Berle suggested that a corpo-
rate group should be looked upon as a unit rather than as a collection of
various independent entities. 99 The updated version of the argument is
that:
Where the constituent components of the group form a unitary
business and conduct interrelated operations as part of an inte-
grated enterprise under common direction directed at the max-
imization of return for the group as a whole, the legal
consequences . . . should reflect a judgment of the extent to
which the objectives of the particular procedural rule under dis-
cussion are best achieved in dealing with the several compo-
nents of the group.2 °°
The writer, Professor Blumberg, concluded that an enterprise ap-
thoroughly summarized in P. BLUMBERG, supra note 18, at §§ 1.02-1.02.1. These include
instrumentality, identity, alter ego, and agency theories. Each of these traditional theories uses
a somewhat formalistic laundry list, similar to the all-the-facts-and-circumstances test used in
the intraenterprise context, to determine when to pierce the corporate veil.
197. Id.
198. P. BLUMBERG, supra note 18, at 23. According to Professor Blumberg, emergence of
this trend is generally recognized. Id. at 24 n.1 (citing L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PROD-
ucrs LIABILITY § 2A.01 (1982); 1 THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
§§ 11.01-.06 (V. Nanda ed. 1981); Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enter-
prise, 71 MICH. L. REv. 789 (1971); Davis, Workmen's Compensation-Using an Enterprise
Theory of Employment to Determine Who is a Third Party Tort-Feaser, 32 U. PiTr. L. REv.
289 (1971); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 500-17 (1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Acturial Process--The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961); Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L.
Rtv. 343 (1947)).
199. Professor Berle had stated: "The corporation is emerging as an enterprise bounded by
economics, rather than as an artificial mystic personality bounded by forms of words in a
charter, minute books, and books of account." Berle, supra note 198, at 345.
200. P. BLUMBIERG, supra note 18, at 24.
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proach should replace the various entity rules for piercing the corporate
veil in the subsidiary context. Such a focus would result in a more defen-
sible and coherent body of law than the "useless metaphors and conclu-
sionary terms that are the foundations of 'piercing the veil'
jurisprudence."20 1
The Copperweld decision indirectly supports the enterprise theory
suggested by Professor Blumberg by recognizing the economic singleness
of a multicorporate enterprise. In fact, Professor Blumberg's description
of an enterprise is only a more sophisticated version of the Court's de-
scription in Copperweld.
The application of Copperweld to this area has not gone totally un-
noticed by the courts. The bankruptcy matter of In re G & L Packing
Co.,2 2 is the sole example. There, a family meat processing corporation
formed a slaughtering business in response to a shortage of local meat in
the market.20 3 The two businesses maintained separate records but the
wife of the owner of the meat processor was the president, sole director
and shareholder of the meat supply corporation.204 This corporation
eventually failed. The court faced the question of whether the creditors
of the supply corporation could collect debts from the family packing
corporation under a provision of the Packers & Stockyards Act2"5 which
would enable them to do so if the corporations were considered a single
entity.
The court noted that, as a general matter, the law of the state of
incorporation normally determines internal corporate issues. However,
the court read Copperweld to mean that where strong federal policy ex-
ists, federal common law should control on the corporate identity issue:
Although the Copperweld Court did not frame the problem
before it as one of. . . choice-of-law, it. . . implicitly decided
the choice of law question in favor of applying a federal rule of
decision. That is, the Court considered the policy and purpose
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, found that such policy would be
disserved by treating corporations that are separate under state
law as independent entities, and therefore rejected the applica-
tion of state corporate law to this issue.20 6
201. Id.
202. 41 Bankr. 903 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
203. Id. at 906.
204. Id. at 907.
205. 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1982).
206. 41 Bankr. at 911 (citing, Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veik The Alter Ego Doc-
trine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1982)). The court held that the
corporate veil should be pierced because "[a]s in Copperweld, a federal rule of decision [was]
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It is yet to be seen whether Copperweld will be used to support the
general enterprise liability theory suggested by Professor Blumberg, or
whether it will continue to be limited to situations in which strong fed-
eral policy calls for the application of federal common law over state law
on the issue of piercing the corporate veil. The Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the enterprise concept to multicorporate firms should at least send
a signal to both federal and state courts: It may be time to unravel the
corporate veil, at least to the extent that it has protected economic sub-
units as if they were shareholders, where strong federal policy supports
recognizing a firm's singleness. A desire to recognize substance over
form, mandated in Copperweld, would seem to demand as much.
V. CONCLUSION
In Copperweld, the Court finally confronted the anomalies of the
intraenterprise doctrine. The rejection of the doctrine implies that the
Court's holding should be extended to include majority-owned affiliates
and subsidiaries. Not to do so undermines the Court's reasoning that
section 1 entities are economic enterprises. Similarly, minority con-
trolled entities should be permitted to rebut a presumption of conspirato-
rial capacity by showing that the actual decisionmaking power and
control is with the parent corporation.
The complete adoption of an economic enterprise theory for anti-
trust law should also prompt courts to reconsider the present standards
for piercing the corporate veil. Multicorporate enterprises should enjoy
the burdens of their associations as well as the benefits.
James A. Keyte
necessary to ensure the substance, not form, determines whether a separately incorporated
entity is in fact the alter ego. ... Id.
[Vol. 18
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1103:
FURTHER ABUSE OF THE RAPE VICTIM
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Dean Wigmore, "[n]o question of evidence has been
more controverted" 1 than the admissibility at trial of a rape victim's pre-
vious sexual conduct. The controversy entails important political as well
as legal considerations.
Reputation and opinion evidence of a rape victim's previous sexual
conduct, used in a rape case to prove consent, is arguably irrelevant and
prejudicial in a society where neighbors are often strangers and premari-
tal or nonmarital sex is commonly accepted. However, because such evi-
dence is frequently deemed admissible, women are discouraged from
pursuing complaints after being raped because of their fear of harassment
on the witness stand. The fears of victims in this regard are not un-
founded. Because they are permitted by rules of evidence to do so, de-
fense attorneys dwell on reputation and opinion testimony filled with
rumors of the victims' sexual lives. Thus, the focus of the judicial pro-
ceedings shifts, placing the victims rather than the defendants on trial.
Adoption in California of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which severely limits the defense counsel's inquiry into the vic-
tim's past sexual conduct, could potentially alleviate these problems.
Over the last few decades, state legislatures gradually have begun to re-
spond to the growing fears of women and to the criticisms of the laws
relating to the crime of rape. Perhaps it is now time for California to
make such a response.
This Comment evaluates section 1103 of the California Evidence
Code (CEC) and Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The
author concludes that California should adopt the substantive provisions
of Rule 412 regarding methods of proving consent in rape cases.
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In preparing a consent defense in a rape trial, a defense attorney
often focuses upon the victim's prior sexual conduct to suggest her will-
ingness to consent on the specific occasion in question. Such a defense is
usually introduced through circumstantial evidence,2 as opposed to di-
1. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200, at 682 (3d ed. 1940).
2. "The circumstantial use of character involves not only the establishment of the rele-
